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The "End" of:
Science, Philosophy, and Legal Theory
JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Pierre Schlag's fascinating critique of reason raises fundamental
issues regarding the status of reason within the legal academy, and, in
turn, the status of legal theory as an enterprise.' Since its inception,
there has been an infatuation with reason in American law. This
enchantment, importantly, was not peculiar to legal theorists. Indeed,
the call to reason is an instrumentalist strategy on the part of legal theo-
rists. It lends the legitimacy of "objectivity" to the inherently political
enterprise of law. Historically, these claims had an air of credibility
given the prestige of science or as Schlag argues, "one could understand
the plight of reason in American law, not so much as an oddity or a
peculiarity, but rather as emblematic or symptomatic of some much
broader cultural tendencies."2 What makes our particular historical
moment unique is that, unlike previous eras, the very idea of science is
being interrogated, and by implication, notions of objectivity and reason
are coming under heavy assault in a variety of intellectual fields.
Arguably, it is the general assault on reason that makes Schlag's
critique of legal reasoning particularly intelligible and salient. Schlag
has, in my mind, successfully dealt a significant skeptical blow to the
project of doing a certain form of legal theory-legal theory based on a
conception of universal truth. In this regard, reason is part of "the
unthought" of American legal theory, and does serve the function of
"central command."' 3
This essay will reflect upon the prospects for legal theory in an era
in which the very notion of reason has been called into question. Given
the particular instability of reason in today's intellectual climate, can
* Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
participants of the "Beyond Right and Reason" legal theory symposium, and the American
University, Washington College of Law faculty workshop for their helpful suggestions and
comments. In addition, the author is grateful for comments from Steve Subrin and Steve
Nathanson. Special thanks also to Ann McCarthy Hackney for reviewing early drafts of this
essay.
1. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998).
2. Id. at 14.
3. Schlag argues that reason is "the unthought" of American legal theory because "[i]t is an
orientation that is already in place, even before reason is called upon to do its work." Id. at 23.
As such, reason acts as the "central command," governing legal discourse. Id. at 26-29.
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legal theorists continue with their "excessive constructions," 4 or have we
reached the "end" of legal theory as we know it? I think the answer is
that we have reached the end of legal theory if only for the reason that it
seems highly implausible to continue on with a quintessentially modern-
ist project in our postmodem times.5 In this regard, I agree with the
descriptive thrust of Schlag's thesis-law's enchantment of reason.
However, I disagree with what I take to be his prescriptive anecdote-
pessimistic relativism. I will not pretend to suggest a way out of the
relativist quagmire, but would like to point out alternatives that others
(particularly in the fields of science and philosophy) have suggested may
be of use as we contemplate the future direction of legal theory.
II. THE "END" OF SCIENCE
Science is the grand narrative that has dominated Western thought
since Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon penned their opuses in the sev-
enteenth century.6 The seventeenth-century infatuation with science
culminated with Newton's theory of physical laws, ushering in the "Sci-
entific Revolution." The mechanistic vision of the universe laid out by
Newton became the model of reason.7 It seemed as though Newton had
uncovered the tools to unlock the secrets of the universe. Seventeenth-
century scientists had been struggling to devise a theory of universal
gravitation that would replace ancient conceptions. At issue was the
need to explain the motions of heavenly bodies. Galileo had already
described earthly gravitational phenomenon, and now Newton had taken
the scientific enterprise to the next level. He constructed a set of laws
explaining the mechanics of motion in the heavens as well as on earth.
The entire universe could be analogized to a machine, and its workings
uncovered through the power of reason. While this rendition of
Newtonian physics, as a description of how the universe hangs together,
no doubt sounds familiar enough, his description of why the world acts
as it does often gets lost in the rendition. However, the presumptions
supporting Newton's laws of physics are important in understanding the
larger meaning of the Newtonian worldview and to situating his thought
4. Id. at 145.
5. I know that the moment the terms modernism and postmodernism are introduced into any
argument there is immediately room for definitional ambiguity. I do not propose to offer a
definition for either of these terms but would point to the historical account of science and
philosophy in this essay as offering a chronology of modernism and postmodernism in science,
philosophy, and legal theory.
6. RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD (George Heffernan ed. & trans., 1994)
(1637); FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM (Thomas Fowler ed., 1965) (1620).
7. ISSAC NEWTON, MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY (1687), available
at http://members.tripod.com/-gravitee.
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in the Western intellectual tradition.8
What accounted for gravitational phenomena? Newton, in an act of
what he described as speculative philosophy (as opposed to the experi-
mental philosophy that accounted for the laws of gravity), ascribed grav-
itational force to a stationary ethereal substance pervading the universe.
This substance had the effect of repelling bodies in such a way as to
account for gravitational pull. God, or to borrow the phrase coined by
Newton, "The Deity," acted as the puppetmaster orchestrating this phe-
nomenon.9 The Deity was omnipresent and fixed-the one constant in
time and space. As such, Newton postulated, time and space could be
measured as absolute entities and were also fixed. Stephen Mason sums
up the importance of this vision of the universe:
Such a view that time, space, and motion were absolute quantities
persisted right down to the twentieth century, for in all subsequent
theories involving an etherial medium.., there was one set of sys-
tems and observers in the universe who could measure in principle
absolute velocities, namely those that were at rest in the cosmic
order. o
This vision of absolute truth being knowable in the natural world, com-
bined with Descartes's metaphysical conception of absolute knowledge,
framed modernity and the quest for certainty (enchantment of reason)
that has been a hallmark of Western intellectual thought.
In the early twentieth century, Albert Einstein put a facially relativ-
ist spin on Newtonian physics. Under the principle of relativity, physi-
cal laws are constant no matter where one is positioned in the universe."
All positions and observers are equal. The idea of a Deity regulating
and observing the world from some fixed position is no longer neces-
sary. Einstein replaced the concept of amorphous ether holding the
world together with the idea of relativity:
The measurements made by any given pair of observers would be
completely symmetrical, in particular they would both ascribe the
same relative velocity to the other. Thus there were no privileged
observers, and no absolute space nor absolute time. The length of a
rod would depend upon the relative velocity of the observer that mea-
sured it, so too would the time kept by a given clock. Furthermore no
two observers in relative motion would observe two events as simul-
taneous unless the events occurred in the same place.'
2
8. The following rendition of Newtonian physics comes largely from STEPHEN MASON, A
HISTORY OF THE SCIENCES (1962) (originally published in 1956 under the title, MAIN CURRENTS
OF SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT).
9. NEWTON, supra note 7.
10. MASON, supra note 8, at 207.
11. ALBERT EINSTEIN, THE MEANING OF RELATIVITY (5th ed. 1984) (1921).
12. MASON, supra note 8, at 544-45. Einstein's theory of relativity is divided into two parts,
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While different observers would rightly view phenomenon from
their own perspective, Einstein had devised a set of transformation equa-
tions to reconcile the differences. With the use of transformation equa-
tions, physicists had actually expanded their realm of knowledge.
Einstein's theory of relativity did not throw physics into a relativistic
quagmire. Outside of physics, however, in the broader social milieu,
Einstein's theory was viewed as having radical implications for a relativ-
istic worldview. Einstein rightly viewed these inferences from his work
as misguided. Yet, even mistaken perceptions can have profound effects
on our conception of the world. Einstein had unwittingly set in motion
the seeds of twentieth century skepticism. Although non-scientists were
incorrect in their view regarding relativity theory, the next major discov-
ery in physics, quantum mechanics, would in fact reveal the relativistic
nature of the physical world.
During the period in which Einstein was formulating his theory of
relativity, physicists began peering deeper into the structure of matter,
focusing on quanta. Early in his career, Einstein had identified the
quanta as the individual unit of energy contained in light, thereby dispel-
ling the previous theory that light energy was a continuous process. Ein-
stein's work in this area built on Max Planck's research, Planck had
earlier been doing research on the properties of quanta-arguing that the
quanta is the fundamental measurement of radiated energy. This led to
the development of quantum mechanics, the mathematical representation
of atoms. However, unlike the certainty that complimented the
Newtonian mathematical representation of universal order and Ein-
stein's transformation equations, there was a probabilistic element to
quantum mechanics.
Electrons, the elementary particles that are the fundamental constit-
uents of matter spinning around the nucleus of the atom, could not be
located with certainty at any given point. Werner Heisenberg made this
"uncertainty principle" famous. 3 At a fundamental level it was impos-
sible to have precise measurements, and the notion of strict causality had
been thrown into doubt. The implications of the theory were so
profound that Einstein refused to accept it, declaring, in the now famous
quote, that God "does not play dice with the world."14 Einstein would
end his career in science searching for a "unified field theory" that
would serve as the type of totalizing theory of the physical world that
Newton had been thought to have constructed. It was a failed effort.
his general theory and his special theory. He put forth his special theory first and then followed it
with the general theory with its broader application.
13. American Institute of Physics website, at http://www.aip.org/history/heisenberg/pOl.htlm.
14. Wolfram Research website, at http://scienceworld.wolfram.com/biography/einstein.html.
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The developments in physics are emblematic of twentieth century
science. Science has become a bit less sure of itself. The insecurity
does not come from an inability to accomplish Herculean technological
tasks-such as the construction of "smart" bombs or the invention of
hand-held computers-but from a failure to provide the ultimate truth
about the universe. This has led to the inevitable declaration, "The End
of Science." Of course, in recent times there has been a virtual cottage
industry in "End of' predictions: "The End of History," "The End of
Progress," "The End of Science," and so on. With regard to science, and
I think other fields of endeavor as well, it is more appropriate to think of
the current phase of history as marking the intense questioning of a par-
ticular type of scientific quest, not the praxis of science. The quest
began with the scientific revolution and has consumed Western intellec-
tual thought on a number of levels-including legal theory.
A thorough accounting of the "End of Science" literature is beyond
the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, John Horgan's relatively accessi-
ble text provides a good overview of the topic and lays out the gist of
what I take from the debate. 5 The text is particularly useful because it
does not set out to answer the question whether science has come to an
end, but to provide a range of perspectives on the issue. I hope that it
lends support to my assertion that there is a great deal of questioning
regarding the status of science-even amongst highly respected
scientists.
Horgan approaches the subject from the perspective of a journalist
interested in whether "science" has reached its limits and discovered that
the holy grail of science, "The Answer," is out of its reach. The Answer
would be the theory that provides the solution to the mysteries of exis-
tence-the theory Einstein sought. It would be the ultimate theory of
scientific "Truth." Horgan's basic thesis is that science has rubbed up
against certain stubborn limits to its quest for The Answer. The most
prominent of these barriers is science's own success. In an ironic twist,
the end of science could simply mean that we know enough of the basic
story about the way the world works such that there is not much for
scientists to do. Of course, this would be a state of nirvana if our resting
point had provided The Answer.
Horgan attempts to sustain his thesis by synthesizing the responses
he receives in his travels through questioning a host of prominent scien-
tists and intellectuals about the subject. It is up for debate whether Hor-
gan succeeds in confirming his central thesis: the end of science.
However, one does come away after reading the chronicle with a sense
15. JOHN HORGAN, THE END OF SCIENCE: FACING THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE
TWILIGHT OF THE SCIENTIFIC AGE (1996).
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that there is a great deal more skepticism, and indeed mysticism, in the
sciences than one might suspect. Nowhere is this more evident than in
what is normally considered the "hardest" of sciences: physics. Here,
we can pick up with the story of physics' post-quantum mechanics.
Physicists have made tremendous strides in theorizing about the
deep structure of matter. In the 1980s their efforts led to a possible.
answer to the puzzle-superstring theory. According to superstring the-
ory, the ultimate foundation for matter is not a point, which had been
hypothesized under quantum mechanics, but minute loops of energy.
These ten dimensional loops of energy dance about in space, creating the
stuff of the universe. Aside from the fact that superstring theory
requires that we cope with a phenomenon that has six more dimensions
than our own four (the three of space, plus time), it is a phenomenon that
is extremely small and distant. Horgan describes it as follows: "the
strings are as small in comparison to a proton as a proton is in compari-
son to the solar system .... They are more distant from us, in a sense,
than are the quasars that lurk at the farthest edge of the visible uni-
verse.' 6 Physicists believed that they might have some hope in over-
coming these seemingly insurmountable challenges with the
construction of the superconducting supercollider, an "instrument" fifty-
four miles in circumference that was to be built in Texas. Unfortunately,
Congress pulled funding for the supercollider. In any event, Horgan
points out that in order for such a device to even begin to peer at super-
strings, it would have to measure some 1,000 light years around (1,000
times the size of the solar system). It does not seem as if physicists will
be looking at superstrings anytime soon. So what are theoretical physi-
cists up to nowadays?
One of the chief opponents of relativism in science, particularly
physics, is Sheldon Glashow. Glashow, a Nobel laureate in physics,
once dreamed of constructing a unified theory, but became disillusioned
with the drift of physics towards superstring theory. 7 Why? As is evi-
dent from the description above, it cannot be proven empirically. Unlike
Newtonian physics and Einstein's theory of relativity, we do not have
the capacity to verify or refute the conjecture. Therefore, it does not
qualify as physics-at least as Glashow defines it. It is more akin to a
leap of "faith."
Glashow's skepticism regarding superstring theory can be juxta-
posed to a leading innovator in the field, Ed Witten. Witten emphasizes
that while superstring theory may not be empirically testable, it has the
16. Id. at 62.
17. Id. at 63.
[Vol. 57:629
2003] THE "END" OF: SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND LEGAL THEORY 635
qualities of "incredible consistency, remarkable elegance, and beauty." 8
Horgan describes this sort of argument as "naive ironic science."' 9 It is
practiced by scientists who believe that they can derive scientific truths
from intuition. In short, it is science practiced as faith. Horgan notes
that David Lindley, who wrote The End of Physics, argues that given the
speculative nature of superstring theory, physics is in "danger of becom-
ing a branch of aesthetics."2
At a minimum, physicists, even those who hold out hope for super-
string theory, have reconsidered the quest for certainty. Steven Wein-
berg, author of Dreams of a Final Theory, has noted, "[a] lot of
philosophy of science going back to the Greeks has been poisoned by
the quest for certainty, which seems to me a false search."'"
So far, I have presented the "orthodox" interpretation of quantum
mechanics as implying a probabilistic universe. This was the position
articulated by Niels Bohr and commonly referred to as the Copenhagen
interpretation.22 The noted physicist, David Bohm, has offered a deter-
ministic interpretation of quantum mechanics in an effort to undercut its
relativist implications.2 3 He essentially gave a physical explanation, the
pilot wave phenomenon, for Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Ironi-
cally, Bohm also has championed a fundamental reconsideration of how
we think about science. Bohm argues that the mechanistic view, our
Newtonian and Cartesian legacy, still dominates scientific thinking.24
However, given that the basic assumption behind this view, the appear-
ance of reality, is false, we are in effect tilting at windmills.
Science is an inexhaustible enterprise in which, once we determine
what seems to be an appearance of reality, we move to a different level
of perception and appearance-reality changes. The leap from a
Newtonian perspective to theories of relativity leading to a quantum
view is a perfect example of this phenomenon. Bohm believes that we
would be well served if we thought in terms of merging art and science:
"[T]he division of art and science is temporary. It didn't exist in the
past, and there is no reason why it should go on in the future. 21 5 The
18. Id. at 69.
19. David Hoffman, Book Review: The End of Science: Facing the Limits of Knowledge in the
Twilight of the Scientific Age, 45 NOTICES OF' THE AMS 260, 261 (1998), available at http://
www.ams.org/notices/199802/bookrev-hoffman.pdf.
20. HORGAN, supra note 15, at 70.
21. Id. at 74.
22. John G. Cramer, The Transactional Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, 58 REV. MOD.
PHYSIcS 647 (1986).
23. Id.
24. HORGAN, supra note 15, at 87.
25. Anthony Craig, The Analogue Universe (2000), available at http://thegoldenmean.
homestead.com/analogue.html.
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idea is that just as art has as its essence an attempt to deal with percep-
tion, so does science.26
Declaring the "end" of science does not necessarily mean that one
needs to adopt some fanciful postmodern notion that there are no scien-
tific truths. Newton's theory of gravity, in its limited application, is cor-
rect. As Sheldon Glashow has aptly put it, Newton's laws are "fine for
predicting the trajectories of ICBMs or the times of eclipses. '2 7 Quan-
tum theory works-just look at the nuclear nightmare it has brought
upon us. Nevertheless, it deals a heavy blow to the preeminence of sci-
ence and the quest for certainty (The Answer). The Nobel Prize winning
physicist, Richard Feynman, has bemoaned that the fundamental rules
governing the physical world have been revealed to us, yet science will
no longer be able to stave off the incursions of philosophers. 28 How-
ever, as Horgan has noted, the end of science has come from within.
29
This is the central lesson one draws from his encounters. Without rec-
onciling ourselves to some form of relativism, how do we cope with
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle or the fact that there is a plausible
alternative explanation in Bohm's theory? It is all a matter of
perspective.
III. THE "END" OF PHILOSOPHY
Philosophers have traditionally, as part of their Kantian heritage,
viewed one of their principal roles as arbiters of what constitutes knowl-
edge. In keeping with this function, they have kept a very watchful eye
on developments in the sciences. Indeed, much of the history of philos-
ophy in the West tracks developments in science. The relationship (even
if sometimes hostile) between Newtonian physics and Cartesian philoso-
phy is a quintessential example of this phenomenon. Given this symbi-
otic relationship, it is not surprising that as the sciences have become
less dogmatic (Newtonian), philosophy has begun to show cracks in its
edifice.
Logical empiricism, a movement that may loosely be dated back to
the early twentieth century, is the most recent and powerful scientific
conception of philosophy. The logical empiricists wished to eliminate
what they viewed to be Kantian metaphysics. The idea was not to
replace philosophy with another form of metaphysical musing, but to
substitute in its place the scientific method-the perfect merging of sci-
26. HORGAN, supra note 15, at 88.
27. Sheldon Lee Glashow, The Death of Science!?, in THE END OF SCIENCE? ATTACK AND
DEFENSE NOBEL CONFERENCE XXV 23, 29 (Richard Elvee ed., 1992).
28. HORGAN, supra note 15, at 90-91.
29. See generally HORGAN, supra note 15.
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ence and philosophy. (Of course, Kant had also taken this to be his
task.) Ironically, the seeds of logical empiricism's demise were sewn by
one of its principal founders-Rudolph Carnap.
Carnap had announced the mission of logical empiricism to be the
placement of philosophy on a scientific footing.3" However, no sooner
had this manifesto of logical empiricism been published that it met with
immediate criticism within the movement, forcing Carnap to reconcep-
tualize his views. Carnap eventually accepted that there was no viable
correspondence theory of truth and that the notion of truth had more to
do with language than reality.31
While the logical empiricist program of "technical" philosophy,
under the rubric of logical positivism, progressed unabated in the United
States post-World War II, grand claims to the project of unifying science
and philosophy fell into disfavor. The linchpin of this turn was the rec-
ognition that claims to Truth could no longer be sustained. Two of the
most influential figures in American philosophy, W.V. Quine and Alfred
Sellars, are in good part responsible for demonstrating the point. In per-
haps the most influential argument in post-World War II American phi-
losophy, Quine argued in Two Dogmas of Empiricism that two of the
key dogmas of logical empiricism could not be sustained: 1) the demar-
cation between logical and synthetic truths; and 2) that scientific state-
ments could be reduced to immediate experience.32 Without these false
dogmas in place, philosophers could no longer lay claim to embarking
on an endeavor that would lead to the Truth. While the technical work
of the logical empiricists (such as looking at the structure of language
and logic of statements) would go on unabated, much as the work of
science has continued forward, the hope of a grand theory of knowledge,
the philosophical equivalent to The Answer, had to be abandoned.
The most popular harbinger of this retrenchment in philosophy is
Richard Rorty who, in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (hereinafter
"Mirror of Nature") critiques the Kantian philosophical tradition.33 He
describes this as the tradition obsessed with constructing a totalizing the-
ory of knowledge so as to bring all of human inquiry under reason's
enchantment. At no time was this quest more evident than in the efforts
of logical positivists to construct a philosophy that would "unify" the
sciences. Rorty chronicles the collapse of this effort, with a particular
30. RUDOLF CARNAP, THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD (1967) (originally published
in German under the title, DER LOGISCHE AUFBAU DER WELT (1928)).
31. For a discussion of these developments, see CHRISTIAN DELACAMPAGNE, A HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1999) (originally published as HITOIRE DE LA
PHILOSOPHIE AU XX' SIECLE in 1995).
32. Willard von Orman Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHI. REv. 20 (1951).
33. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
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focus on Quine and Sellars, and what he takes to be the "end" of the
Philosophical project.
Rorty is faced with the same dilemma that plagues any proponent
of an "end of' thesis: Where do we go from there? We can take his
effort as an example of a philosophical approach to the question. Of
course, Rorty's is just one of many approaches that have been suggested,
but given his popular status, it is a useful starting point. One problem
with trying to construct a synopsis of Rorty's position is that he has
published widely, and his position has not necessarily been consistent.
For purposes of brevity, I will focus my attention on Mirror of Nature,
one of his most important and influential works on the topic.
In Mirror of Nature, Rorty suggests that the future of philosophy is
in "hermeneutics." Yet, he is not putting hermeneutics forward as a suc-
cessor project for epistemology, but as "an expression of hope that the
cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will not be filled-that
our culture should become one in which the demand for constraint and
confrontation is no longer felt."34 In offering hermeneutics as a pre-
scription for philosophy, Rorty runs up against the same bogeyman as
Schlag: "To suggest that there is no such common ground [(universal
conception of knowledge)] seems to endanger rationality. 35
Of course, as Schlag recognizes, the enchantment with reason has
as its antecedent the presumption of a common (commensurable) lan-
guage. 36 Rorty's hermeneutics would eviscerate this assumption and
leave us in the position of recognizing a multiplicity of languages that
we do not attempt to translate but with which we dialogue. Rorty's cri-
tique of commensurability borrows heavily from Thomas Kuhn's Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolutions, itself a major testament to the shift
towards relativism3 7-although Kuhn has explicitly rejected certain rela-
tivists' "misreadings" of his position.38
Rorty views the concept of rationality as being culturally contin-
gent. However, he is not as willing to submerge the concept of reason as
Schlag appears to be. He is still fond of what he refers to as our Enlight-
enment inheritance. The hermeneutics he proposes, under the rubric of
"edification," is described as a commitment to finding "new, better,
more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking. ' 39 These ways of
speaking may come from a variety of perspectives, including "poetic"
34. Id. at 315.
35. Id. at 317.
36. SCHLAG, supra note 1, at 45-46.
37. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
38. THOMAS KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION
AND CHANGE (1977).
39. RORTY, supra note 33, at 360.
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activity. In this sense, Rorty is asking for the type of openness Schlag
desires. Schlag regrets that our enchantment with reason has come at
the cost of "sacrificing the other sources of belief, sources such as expe-
rience, custom, convention, intuition, disclosure, perception, awareness,
understanding, and so on."4 0 However, Rorty also holds onto the con-
cept of "objectivity," defined as "conformity to the norms of justifica-
tion (for assertions and for actions) we find about us."'" My hunch is
that Schlag would not feel comfortable with this formulation because,
although Rorty warns against assertions that the norms of justification
have any transhistorical or transcultural foundational grounding, he does
seem to risk falling into the trap of reason. Schlag warns that faint calls
for recognition of non-reason centered values of belief are often "recast
in the image of reason or they are relegated to a secondary supporting
status where they serve to confirm what reason has already
wrought" 4 -thence, my description of Schlag as a "pessimistic
relativist."
While Rorty's vision of hermeneutics may seem far afield from the
science debates described above, there are some parallels between his
vision and what scientists have been forced to do as scientists in the
post-Newtonian era. Rorty's edifying philosophy has affinities with
what Horgan describes as ironic science. Just as the science debates
have not cut off, without consideration, what might be thought of as
"abnormal" inquiry, Rorty would not have our general quest for knowl-
edge be limited to the "normal"-that which conforms to the norms
around us.43 But, let us keep the conversation going.
The anti-foundational turn in philosophy has made itself manifest
in the debates over the end of science. While we previously discussed
what scientists do given the state of science, physics in particular, it is
useful to discuss how philosophers have weighed in on what it means to
do science. Ian Hacking, in his presentation to the twenty-fifth Nobel
Conference, entitled "The End of Science? Attack and Defense," offered
an intriguing answer to the question: where do we go from here?
Hacking, in his essay "Disunified Science," begins by making it
clear that he is not a skeptic when it comes to science and is dismissive
of what he refers to as the "rage against reason."44 However, he does
share the skeptical desire to "prune" the ideology of science. 45 For
40. SCHLAG, supra note 1, at 58.
41. RORTY, supra note 33, at 361.
42. SCHLAO, supra note 1, at 142.
43. RORTY, supra note 33, at 303.
44. Ian Hacking, Disunified Science, in THE END OF SCIENCE? ATrACK AND DEFENSE NOBEL
CONFERENCE XXV 33, 34 (Richard Elvee ed., 1992).
45. Id.
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Hacking, the ideology of science revolves around assertions that there is
"one ultimate reality, one ultimate truth, one road to the truth (the scien-
tific method), one sound mode of reasoning, [and] one national way of
speaking. 46 Hacking believes that this ideology has come under legiti-
mate critique as far back as initial criticisms of Bacon and Galileo. Nev-
ertheless, he refuses to accept that science is not an objective enterprise
or that we have reached the end of science. He takes as a prescient fact
that science is almost universally accepted as a good thing. To harken
back to Rorty, science is a part of our Enlightenment inheritance that we
might want to keep around. The problem is to dethrone it from the all-
encompassing position it has assumed since Bacon and Descartes.
Hacking argues that the real issue is not with science but with the
hold that the concept of "unity" has on the Western mind. We are
obsessed with the notion that there is The (singular) Answer. Hacking
proposes that we substitute this concept of "singleness" with one of
"harmonious integration."47 This alternative vision of harmonious inte-
gration, which is analogous to Rorty's concept of conversation, has con-
crete implications. For example, Hacking describes the University of
California at Berkeley biology department that is divided into six divi-
sions as opposed to being placed under a single umbrella. This need to
have a disunified science is manifest because there is no common lan-
guage of science-apparently not even within biology. Hacking extends
his thesis even further to argue that there is no common method in sci-
ence. Quoting A.C. Crombie on the different styles of scientific reason-
ing in the European tradition, Hacking lists six: 1) mathematical/
axiomatic; 2) experimental; 3) hypothetical modeling; 4) ordering by
comparison and taxonomy; 5) statistical analysis of populations; and 6)
historical derivation of genetic development.48
Given the plurality of voices in science, there must be some way of
bridging the divide between incommensurable enterprises that have the
family resemblance of being a science. Hacking introduces the concept
of "unifiers" ("tools, practices, and bodies of knowledge that span sci-
ence") for bridging. 49 One example of a unifier is mathematics, a "lan-
guage" that spans a variety of scientific disciplines. Hacking also cites
computation and even scientific instruments as scientific unifiers. He is
admittedly tentative in his discussion of unifiers, but does present an
46. Id. at 37.
47. Id. at 39.
48. Id. at 46 (relying on A.C. Crombie, Philosophical Presuppositions and Shifting
Interpretations of Galileo, in THEORY CHANGE, ANCIENT AXIOMATICS, AND GALILEO'S
METHODOLOGY (198 1)).
49. Id. at 47.
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interesting conception of how incommensurable theories might hang
together in some sort of stable relationship:
Stability results from a sort of self-authentication resulting from the
mutual adjustment of theory, apparatus, data and much more. We get
stability across radical change partly because a great many lesser sci-
entific revolutions do not result in discarding a body of knowledge
but in supplementing it with new kinds of instruments, creating a new
category of data for which radically new theory is demanded ....
Here we see a new use for Kuhn's idea of incommensurability."
Hacking gives an interesting example of the type of analysis suggested
under his theory. One can look at a table as a solid mass of wood or as a
collection of atoms with huge spaces between the particles. How can
this be? There is only one table. Yes, but there are different perspec-
tives from which to analyze that table. Our job is to connect incommen-
surable visions.
Hacking concludes by linking his view of a disunited science with
general cultural movements. He recognizes that in our postmodern
times there is an increasing disunity in a variety of intellectual fields.
Yet somehow there is a myth, dating back to the seventeenth century,
that the sciences are unified. This myth has too often been held up by
those who resist the pull of disunity as proving the correctness of their
position. This is a mistake. The position on the other side, however,
that given the disunity of science we can declare its end, is also mis-
taken. Again, as discussed earlier, what it marks is the end of a certain
conception of science. What are the implications for legal theory?
IV. THE "END" OF LEGAL THEORY
Law and economics represents the most recent systemic attempt to
fashion a legal theory that would provide the scientific foundation for
law. As such, it epitomizes the enchantment of reason that Schlag chal-
lenges. Richard Posner, the chief proponent and philosophical Pied
Piper of law and economics, fashioned a brilliant legal academic career
based on the simple proposition that economic justifications lay behind
the inner workings of the common law. A healthy part of his claim was
that law and economics was simply a more powerful (conforming to the
dictates of reason/science) tool than the previously dominant theory,
legal realism, or any contemporary competitor. Putting in perspective
the triumph of law and economics over legal realism, Posner once
remarked: "One displaces a scholarly approach not by showing that it
has limitations but only by producing a better [(more scientific)]
50. Id. at 49.
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approach." 5'
Over the course of his academic career, this confidence began to be
increasingly eroded by the heavy assault leveled by critics of law and
economics. In particular, it was demonstrated that law and economics
could not hold up to the dictates of science. Its theories were not empiri-
cally testable and its normative assumptions were just that, normative
assumptions. I suppose at that point one might have declared the "End
of Law and Economics." Yet, just as the case with physics, it would
seem to be a bit premature because from all indications, the project of
law and economics is even more vibrant than at its inception. Today it
is almost a necessity for any top-flight law school to have at least some
faculty conversant in law and economics, and in good part it is difficult
to teach even the most basic of law school subjects without some rudi-
mentary knowledge of the field. However, there is no longer the viable
claim to epistemological superiority that marked Posner's earlier
pronouncements.
Indeed, as a sign of the times (following the contour of philosophy
discussed previously), Posner has made a lurch to pragmatism-the
school of thought most associated with Rorty. (Of course, this coincided
with his assent to the judicial bench, but I do not propose that the two
have any relationship.) Somewhere along the way, after being bludg-
eoned for not conforming to the dictates of science, Posner concluded
that there was no longer any need to take cover under science (defined
as a discipline holding out the ultimate Truth) because science no longer
held its exalted status in society.
This argument was first put forward in Posner's Problems of Juris-
prudence.5 2 Posner takes as his hero Jeremy Bentham, whom he credits
as seeking to place law on a scientific footing in arguing for a utilitarian
basis. According to Posner, however, the justification was not meta-
physical, but pragmatic. It is the same sort of pragmatism that Posner
attributes to his other intellectual hero-Oliver Wendell Holmes. And
so the story continues through Benjamin Cardozo (conspicuously pass-
ing over later "legal realists") and eventually ending with Posner as the
contemporary representative of pragmatist jurisprudence. As such, Pos-
ner argues for an "activity theory of law," supporting the notion of
"objectivity as a cultural and political rather than epistemic attribute of
legal decisions. '' 5' Do we hear echoes of Rorty? Yes.
51. Richard Posner, The Costs of Accidents-A Legal and Economic Analysis, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 636, 637 (1970).
52. RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990) [hereinafter POSNER,
JURISPRUDENCE].
53. Id. at 26.
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Posner places his philosophical pragmatism in the lineage of
Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, Charles Herbert
Mead, Thomas Kuhn and Rorty (on the American front), and Ludwig
Wittgenstein and Jurgen Habermas (on the European front). He is care-
ful to "reject Rorty's Romantic, antiscientific brand of pragmatism,"
however, and has "very little sympathy for most of Habermas's
views"-just so that you would not think he had slipped too far over
into the relativist camp.54 In this sense, Posner really is a throwback to a
certain strand of early twentieth century pragmatism-particularly in his
call for a scientific pragmatism. Reason will not be eclipsed.
Posner realizes that, given our postmodern times, there can no
longer be any a priori claim to Truth. However, he still uses his concep-
tion of reason to act as arbitrator for American legal theory's contempo-
rary dialogue. This comes through loud and clear in Overcoming Law,
Posner's effort to situate the current state of legal scholarship." Posner
reasserts his pragmatic skepticism regarding claims to Truth, proposing
that "[m]ost of our certitudes are simply the beliefs current in whatever
community we happen to belong to." He joins the pragmatists in
"[d]oubting that we will ever know that we have arrived at the ultimate
truth(s)" and thus "values freedom of inquiry, a diversity of views, and
experimentation. 5 6 Posner puts forth a critique of the mind as mirror of
nature, doubting "that there is such a nice correspondence between our
minds and the structure of the universe that we are capable of making
complete and conclusive descriptions of the way things are."57 Posner's
critique of philosophical and legal reasoning are eerily similar to Rorty's
and Schlag's: "The pragmatist [(Posner)] is especially dubious that the
methods of the analytic philosopher, and its twin, legal reasoning, can be
used to establish moral duties or legal rights. 58 In this regard, Posner
faults the analytic philosopher and legal reasoner with "exaggerating the
domain of logic."59
Because "all perspectives are . . . partial," Posner is obligated to
recognize the contemporary perspectivism in American legal theory.
60
In covering the terrain of legal theory, Posner manages to have some-
thing to say about such divergent fields as law and economics, feminist
theory, law and literature, critical race theory, and "left-wing" legal his-
tory. While a detailed discussion of Posner's views on this multiplicity
54. Id. at 27 n.42.
55. RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995) [hereinafter POSNER, OVERCOMING].
56. Id. at 5-6.
57. Id. at 9.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 10.
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of subjects is beyond the scope of this brief essay, it is revealing that he
sees the need to at least address the proliferation of ideas that make up
American legal theory.
We can take as an example of his project Posner's discussion of
critical race theory. Posner takes as his point of departure Patricia Wil-
liams's The Alchemy of Race and Rights.6 ' It would be hard to imagine
a field of legal theory farther removed from Posner's brand of law and
economics. Posner describes the book as taking a "black feminist per-
spective" in an effort to critique "law's pretense to objectivity and
impersonality."62 He identifies Williams's storytelling method as a
novel form, but notes that she is not alone in American legal theory in
her use of literary methods. The subtitle, "Diary of a Law Professor,"
reveals Williams's purpose as providing a chronicle of the law and soci-
ety through her gaze. At points, Posner is highly complimentary of Wil-
liams, citing her "powerful gift for narration" and comparing her
favorably to Tom Wolfe.6 3 Nevertheless, Posner is also very critical.
The criticism has as its foundation certain assumptions about the
nature of legal reasoning. Posner is particularly taken aback at what he
sees as Williams's failure to deal with facts. This first arises in Wil-
liams's description of a young, white store clerk in New York City who
refuses her entry under the guise of the store being closed. In her narra-
tive, Williams assumes that the store was open, since it was one o'clock
in the afternoon on a weekend before Christmas. Posner queries, was
the store in fact closed? He is critical of the appearance that "she [(Wil-
liams)]-a lawyer-did not attempt to verify the point."'
Posner notes that by her own account Williams is using the story-
telling genre in "reconceptualizing from 'objective truth' to rhetorical
event" in order to provide a "more nuanced sense of legal and social
responsibility."65 However, since Williams is doing legal theory, Posner
will hold her to the "objective truth" (despite her protestations) and
admonishes her to find out "what really was going on in that white teen-
ager's mind when he told her the store was closed."6 6 What of Posner's
pragmatism? He responds, "[p]ragmatists may be dubious about truth
with a capital T, but they respect those lowercase truths that we call
facts."67
61. PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR
(1991).
62. POSNER, OVERCOMING, supra note 55, at 368.
63. Id. at 369, 371.
64. Id. at 373.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 377.
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Posner takes up several examples where he believes that Williams
has failed to meet the standard of factual truth. Again, I suppose, unlike
Tom Wolfe, Williams is a "lawyer and an academic" and she must play
by the "rules of the scholarly game. '"68 Here, Posner has assumed the
position of high priest of legal reasoning. Schlag astutely identifies the
tension between reason acting as "central command," and "big tent" that
bedevils Posner.69 All too often the tension is resolved, as Posner does,
by forcing those under the tent to heed to the central command of rea-
son. In this regard, Schlag is justified in his pessimism. However, to
Posner's credit, he recognizes that his criticisms of Williams may "turn
out to be one-sided, misleading, and tendentious."7 He understands his
opinion as being "only one voice in an ongoing conversation and can
leave it to others to rectify any omissions or imbalance in [his]
contribution."'"
Posner is actually more convincing when he directly addresses the
substantive implications of doing narrative legal scholarship, as opposed
to his game of factual "gotcha." He argues that, "[a] more basic point is
that the internal perspective-the putting oneself in the other person's
shoes-that is achieved by the exercise of empathetic imagination lacks
normative significance."72
Here, Posner really is attempting to engage Williams on her own
terms. This does not necessarily mean that there will be agreement. He
believes that viewing the world from the perspective of the other can
cloud judgment and is not necessarily edifying. Posner also faults Wil-
liams for a lack of clarity. The argument is not that Williams has made
factual misrepresentations, but a claim that Posner genuinely cannot
understand what Williams means to say when she makes certain state-
ments. In a "big tent" regime where we take the ideas of others seri-
ously and are attempting to bridge the gaps of incommensurability, this
is the type of constructive criticism that is necessary for genuine dia-
logue. Posner ends by recognizing that "the very one-sidedness of [Wil-
liams's] presentation, however questionable by the conventional
standards of scholarship.., has value in providing insight into the psy-
chology and rhetoric of many blacks" 7 3-all human endeavors, includ-
ing literary, do have the potential for contributing to our perception of
the world.74
68. Id. at 380-81.
69. SCHLAG, supra note 1, at 26-29.
70. POSNER, OVERCOMING, supra note 55, at 381.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 384.
74. See generally Craig, supra note 25.
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In this light, I am sure to. the surprise of many, Posner seems to
genuinely be struggling with the problem of incommensurability in legal
theory. Nonetheless, in "overcoming law," Posner does not fully over-
come its enchantment with reason. He still clings to the "methods of
science," even though he does not have any metaphysical "faith in the
power of science ... as the deliverer of final truths. 75
Posner does not take the steps to fully dislodge the enchantment of
reason for which Schlag argues. However, the steps he does take mark a
telling moment in the intellectual history of American legal theory,
given Posner's standing amongst legal theorists, his previous (and con-
tinued) association with the law and economics movement, and his cur-
rent position as a United States Circuit Court Judge. It may be a
moment of hope.
Given Posner's pragmatist turn, it is useful to examine how he
defends his continued championing of law and economics as the pre-
ferred view of the world. His basic defense is a pragmatic sense that
liberal capitalism, the ideological underpinning of Posner's brand of law
and economics, works: there is "mounting evidence that capitalism is
more efficient than socialism. '76 This defense of law and economics
provides a picture-book example of what Schlag refers to as the "false
modesty" of legal neopragmatists.77
Schlag identifies neopragmatist legal theorists who he argues
represent a range of perspectives such as Margaret Jane Radin (politi-
cally progressive), Dan Farber (doctrinal instrumentalist), Joe Singer
(Sartrean existentialist), and Posner. He accuses all of these legal
pragmatists, as well as others who fall into the category, of paying lip
service to a form of perspectivism that signals disenchantment with rea-
son only to pull back once they reach the precipice. For Schlag, what
makes this failure of conviction all the more disconcerting is that the end
result of legal pragmatism is a hodge-podge of policy prescriptions, ulti-
mately (as illustrated by Posner) in the service of the theorist's initial
leanings.
While I agree with Schlag that linking pragmatist theory with any
particular substantive point of view is highly suspect, I am perplexed at
his frustration with the proliferation of perspectives that are generated in
this postmodern setting. If anything, the range of positions, when
viewed from the outside (of legal theory) looking in, only highlights the
very disunity of legal theory Schlag augers. Perhaps there really is a
"big tent."
75. POSNER, OVERCOMING, supra note 55, at 395.
76. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 52, at 384.
77. SCHLAO, supra note 1, at 81.
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Hacking's model of disunity may be the most apt for postmodern
legal theory. The point was made earlier that leading American law
schools now find it a necessity to have scholars on the faculty who spe-
cialize in law and economics. Similarly, there does seem to be a ten-
dency to at least pay lip service to representation from other fields of
legal theory. Nevertheless, while I have not done an empirical survey of
the topic, I do not suspect that there is the same level of representation in
other areas of legal theory-critical legal studies, law and religion, or
critical race theory, for example. The representation model certainly
may not be fully manifest in praxis. In this regard, Schlag's claim of
ideological unity within the legal academy rings true: "The elite Ameri-
can law schools are composed almost entirely (90 percent?) of center-
left democrats ...almost all of whom are committed to a brand of
scholarship that involves issuing normative prescriptions to courts, legis-
latures, each other or some unknown addressee."78
The annual meeting of the American Association of Law Schools
(AALS) provides an interesting peek at what can be referred to as "rep-
resentational disunity." Each year the officers of AALS come up with a
theme for the conference. For example, the theme this year was "Legal
Education Engages the World." The theme serves as a provisional uni-
fier for the conference. Yet, if you asked most of the participants about
the theme, they would look at you with puzzlement. The real energy of
the meeting is in the sections. Group members and professors who have
some shared interest constitute the sections. Frequently the interest is
substantive. For example, there are sections on law and religion, mari-
time law, indigenous nations and peoples, and legal history. There are
also sections centered on theoretical interests such as socio-economics,
social science, law and economics, and jurisprudence.
As the meetings of the various sections convene during overlapping
time periods, the exception being for the one plenary session, there is a
feeling of everyone scurrying to their comers to caucus about their own
little slice of the law or legal theory. While the sections centered on
theory may not be particularly malleable with regard to varying perspec-
tives, one does notice various theoretical perspectives being showcased
from year to year in the substantive sections. Perhaps the shared interest
in a substantive topic, tax law for example, works as a unifier. There-
fore, one year the tax section may take a critical race theory perspective
on tax policy, and another an empirical analysis. It is also frequently the
case that panelists in any given session approach a topic from divergent
perspectives. Indeed, it seems to be an unwritten rule that there be a
mixed representation of the field. It makes the panel more interesting.
78. Id. at 36.
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Does it reflect the type of diversity ("leftists, rightists, skeptics,
unbelievers, legal nihilists, and so on" 7 9 ) that Schlag envisions? Not yet.
But it could be reflective of what the praxis of legal theory may look like
once we get over our enchantment of reason-no overarching theory
dominating discourse or laying claim to Truth by dent of superior rea-
son. This will only come to pass if we heed Rorty's admonition to
maintain a sense of openness and willingness to keep the conversation
going.
V. CONCLUSION
Bush v. Gore exposed the law, even for the uninitiated, as being
highly charged politically-an endeavor whose undertaking, while
cloaked in the garb of reason, had the makings of anything but objective
discourse. On the other hand, the events of September 11, 2001, and the
brand of religious fundamentalism they reflect highlight the risks we run
if we take relativist claims too seriously. This is a danger that even
Richard Rorty would recognize: "[T]he ideals of the Enlightenment not
only are our most precious cultural heritage, but are in danger of disap-
pearance as totalitarian states swallow up more and more of
humanity.'"o
The point of this historiography has been to illustrate the problem-
atic nature of privileging any form of knowledge, let alone legal theory,
as holding out anything akin to absolute "T"ruth. This is not to say that
we can no longer reach justified beliefs regarding what form the social
practice of law should take. I would not even object to descriptions of
such belief as objective. Given our historical moment, however, the
implications of what it means to satisfy the criteria of objectivity or rea-
son are radically altered. It merely marks a point at which we are justi-
fied in taking action based on our belief. Even in the course of taking
action, we must still remain open to further dialogue regarding the
course of our future direction-reason, as "central command," must be
defrocked. This openness is not a form of noblesse oblige, but a realiza-
tion that objectivity is measured by our existing system of norms. Of
course, these norms will continue to include the traditional notions of
reason (we will remain "enchanted"), but will also be open to forms of
expression (and "reason") not previously allowed. Disunity (a "big
tent") should be the rule, not the exception. The idea is not to paralyze
us or have us fall into the quicksand of relativism, but to perhaps make
us all (including Schlag) a bit less sure of ourselves. Perhaps such inse-
curity would be our most effective unifier.
79. Id.
80. RORTY, supra note 33, at 333.
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